

Research Article

# Implementation of Kasad Regulation 37-02/Xii/2012 in Early Detection and Prevention of Radicalism in the East Surabaya Area (Case Study at Kodim 0831/East Surabaya)

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## Abstract

Kodim 0831/East Surabaya organized territorial management to prepare defence areas on land to support the main tasks of Korem/Kodam through Binter method including Social Communication (Komsos). In its implementation Kodim 0831/East Surabaya was guided by Kasad's policy on social communication as stated in Kasad Regulation 37-02/XII/2012. However, the implementation is still considered not optimal. This can be seen from the still occurrence of terrorist suicide bombings in East Surabaya. In addition, some problems that can be identified include factors of resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure. With qualitative research methods with descriptive objectives and data collection techniques with interview techniques, this study describes and analyses how social communications are implemented by the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya officers in early detection and prevention of radicalism in the East Surabaya area. The results of this study indicate that the implementation of social communication policy in the East Surabaya region in terms of communication factors has been running optimally but there are still some obstacles to the factors of resources, disposition or attitude of executors and bureaucratic structures. Therefore, it is necessary to try to overcome these obstacles so that the implementation of Kasad Regulation 37-02 / XII / 2012 in detection and prevent early action of radicalism can run more optimally. This is important so that social communication implementation can make a maximum contribution in the effort to overcome, maintain and prevent from possible forms of non-military threats that can endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national safety.

## Keywords

Implementation, Social Communication, Territorial Management, Indonesian Army

## 1. Background

The Territorial Management of the Indonesian Army is implemented based on geographical, demographic, and social conditions, aimed at establishing a robust territorial resource supported by all necessary elements, serving as a resilient and steadfast instrument in the nation's effort to counter the enemy's capabilities within a Total Warfare System. Territorial

Management is consistently implemented during peacetime, civil emergencies, military emergencies, and wartime to uphold the cohesion between the Indonesian Armed Forces and the populace, hence enhancing national defence. [16].

The implementation of Territorial Management in military operations other than war encompasses dealing with armed

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separatist movements, communal conflicts, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, police support for civil order maintenance, government program facilitation, and search and rescue operations to accomplish the primary tasks of the Indonesian Army.[14] The methods of territorial management (Binter)<sup>1</sup> comprise Bakti TNI, area resilience management, and social communication, in alignment with the procedures and administration of territorial management. The Indonesian Army establishes the Kasad<sup>2</sup> Regulation 37-02/XII/2012 as a directive for the execution of Social Communication (Komsos)<sup>3</sup>. [15] To guarantee the success of policy implementation regulating social communication, specific targets have been established for the policy implementers.

Globalization significantly impacts national defence and various worldwide developments, encompassing educational, socio-cultural, economic, political, and other dimensions. The advancement of technology offers numerous benefits for the global population. However, globalization not only has the positive impacts but also has the negative impact simultaneously. Among these vulnerabilities in social lives is the proliferation of radicalism and terrorism globally. Ethnic and religious extremism is increasingly being discussed by experts and academics globally because of its progressive escalation, which threatens state sovereignty and disrupts international security stability.

The Indonesian populace, as members of the global community, cannot evade the repercussions of this radicalism. Agus SB categorizes radicalism into two forms: idea and action. [3] In terms of ideas, radicalism is an abstract concept that is debated, even when it advocates for the use of violence to attain objectives. Meanwhile, in terms of action, radicalism is expressed through the violent and anarchistic actions of extremist groups aimed at achieving their primary objectives in religious, social, political, and economic domains. At this stage, radicalism begins to converge and incorporates components of terror; hence has the potential to evolve into terrorism. Furthermore, actions of radicalism emerge from an intolerance of diversity and distinctions. Radicals perceive it as a danger to their existence owing to the diversity and disparities that emerge within society.

The East Surabaya region constitutes a segment of the Surabaya Metropolitan City, characterized by a dense and diversified populace. In 2015, the Population and Civil Registration Office of Surabaya City documented that the East Surabaya Region encompasses an area of 108.26 km<sup>2</sup> and has a population of 984,544 individuals. [8] The populace had diverse educational, ethnic, religious, and occupational backgrounds. This circumstance incites radicalism in East Surabaya. From January to December 2016, KontraS Surabaya documented 10 incidences of intolerance, including heretical fatwas against Gafatar, hate speech, and demonstrations. Additionally, there have been 7 arrests of suspected

terrorists involving 13 individuals across several locations in East Java. [12] The most recent statistics indicated that Surabaya had a series of suicide bomb explosions at five distinct locations within a single day and night. [13] On Sunday, May 13, 2018, at 07:15 LT, the initial three suicide bombings transpired at three churches: the Central Pentecostal Church of Surabaya on Arjuna Street, the Indonesian Christian Church on Diponegoro Street, and the Church of Santa Maria Immaculate on Ngagel Madya Street. Within ten hours of the initial explosion, another device detonated at the Wonocolo Simple Flats Complex in Sidoarjo. The final incident occurred on Monday morning, May 14, 2018, at 09:00 local time, including a suicide bomb explosion at the Surabaya Police Headquarters. The episode resulted in a total of 25 victims, comprising 13 offenders and 12 local individuals.

Kodim<sup>4</sup> 0831/East Surabaya is a regional command unit of Korem<sup>5</sup> 084/Surabaya, tasked primarily with organizing forces, enhancing capabilities, and managing territorial defence to ensure land security and support the primary tasks of Korem/Kodam<sup>6</sup>. [19] Kodim 0831/East Surabaya implements territorial management to foster cooperation and coordination with all community elements in the East Surabaya area through methods such as social communication. [18] The purpose is to align perceptions and visions while fostering social awareness in the preparation and establishment of national land defence. Furthermore, through engagement with all societal components, Kodim 0831/East Surabaya is anticipated to possess competencies in early detection for information gathering, situation identification and assessment, as well as in the proactive prediction of vulnerabilities arising within the community. Consequently, it allows for the timely implementation of preventative and pre-emptive measures immediately and proportionally.

However, the execution of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 for the early detection and prevention of radicalism inside Kodim 0831/East Surabaya remains suboptimal. The occurrence of suicide bombings in the East Surabaya region. Furthermore, several issues have been highlighted, including resource concerns, disposition, and bureaucratic organization. The researcher sought to do further investigation in the form of a thesis regarding the implementation of Kasad Regulation 37-02/XII/2012 for the early detection and prevention of radical actions at Kodim 0831/East Surabaya (Case Study at Kodim 0831/East Surabaya).

## 2. Problem Formulation

From the explanation of the background, the researcher formulates the following problems:

- 1) First, how is the communication conducted in the early detection and prevention of radicalism actions in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya according to Kasad regulation

<sup>1</sup> Pembinaan Teritorial

<sup>2</sup> Chief of Army (Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat)

<sup>3</sup> Komunikasi Sosial

<sup>4</sup> District Military Command (Komando Distrik Militer)

<sup>5</sup> Sub-Area Military Command (Komando Resor Militer)

<sup>6</sup> Area Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer)

37-02/XII/2012?

- 2) Second, how is the resource used in the early detection and prevention of radicalism actions in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya according to Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012?
- 3) Third, how is the personnel disposed of in early detection and prevention of radicalism actions in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya according to Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012?
- 4) Fourth, how is the bureaucratic structure set up for early detection and prevention of radicalism actions in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya according to Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012?

### 3. Theory and Method

#### *Defence Theory*

According to Makmur Supriyanto, defense science is defined as a study about how to manage national resources and power in peace, war, and post-war times to deal with the internal and external threats in both military and non-military forms that threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and people's safety to achieve the national security. [6] Baker in Supriyanto mentions that the terrorism threats and various threats to internal security should be encountered by formulating an adequate strategy concept. The strategy should be a unity of at least 4 elements, such as 'offense', 'defense', 'preventive diplomacy', 'countermeasure' and 'recovery capacity'. [6]

#### *Strategy Theory*

Epistemologically, the term 'defence' originates from 'strategy,' tracing back to Tsu Zu, Carl Von Clausewitz, and further developed by 20<sup>th</sup>-century strategist Liddell Hart, who authored a book titled Strategy. He characterised strategy as the art of orchestrating military forces to attain objectives established by political decisions.

#### *Policy Implementation Theory*

George Edward III in Sulila put forward his ideas about the implementation of public policy. He suggested that it should be more pay attention to 4 essential factors, so the policy implementation achieved effectively and efficiently including the communication, resource, personnel disposition and bureaucratic structure. [5]

- 1) *Communication*. It could be explained as the information delivery process from communicator to communicant. In this regard, there are three dimensions that can be used to determine the success of these communication factors, including the transmission dimension, clarity and consistency.
- 2) *Resources*. It played a significant role in the success or failure of the implementation of a policy product. According to George Edward III that these resources consist of human, budget, equipment and authority resources.
- 3) *Disposition or personnel's attitude*. George Edward III

defined the disposition as the wish, hope and tendency of the policy's implementers to apply the policy maximally in order to achieve the objectives of policy. In this regard, he emphasized on the staffing bureaucracy and incentives.

- 4) *Bureaucracy Structure*. George Edward III said that the policy implementation could not be still effective due to the bureaucracy structure' inefficiencies. Furthermore, he mentioned that there are 2 main dimensions of bureaucracy such as standard operating procedures and fragmentation.

### 4. Research Method

This research implied descriptive qualitative research. According to Moleong, the qualitative research is a research approach that produces descriptive data in the form of written or oral data from people and observable behaviours. [1] Descriptive research intended to describe a state or phenomenon as it is. [4] Also, this research applied the case study as approach. It is conducted in-depth and detail on everything related to the subject of the research.

The research subjects are informants related to their respective fields of duty. In this study, seven informants related to the implementation of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 included Dandim<sup>7</sup>, Kasdim<sup>8</sup>, Pasiter<sup>9</sup> and Pasi Intel<sup>10</sup>, Danramil<sup>11</sup>, Babinsa<sup>12</sup> Kodim 0831/East Surabaya and community leaders in the East Surabaya area.

The research object is the implementation of the Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 by the personnel of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya in early detection and prevention of radicalism actions in the East Surabaya area.

Researchers using several techniques in data collection, including documentation studies and interviews. In order to check the validity and correctness of the collected data, the researcher seeks through a credibility test (internal validity) and applies the triangulation source method. Meanwhile, the steps taken in data analysis are adjusted according to Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, namely data collection, data condensation, data presentation, conclusion and verification.

### 5. Discussion

The researched components focus on the implementation of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 with sub-focus on communication, resource, disposition and bureaucratic structure. The discussion is an interpretation or verification of the researcher's findings or results by connecting various concepts

7 Military District Commandant (Komandan Distrik Militer)

8 Chief of Staff in Military District Command (Kepala Staf Distrik Militer)

9 Territorial Staff Officer (Perwira Seksi Teritorial)

10 Intelligence Staff Officer (Perwira Seksi Intelijen)

11 Military Sub-District Commandant (Komandan Rayon Militer)

12 Village Management Senior NCO (Bintara Pembina Desa)

or theories that are relevant to the discussion based on George Edward III's Policy Implementation Theory, which will describe below.

#### 1) Communication

The communication factor in the George Edward III Policy Implementation Theory selected in this study include 3 (three) determinant dimensions The success of the implementation is:

##### Transmission.

Transmission process or information delivery conducted by Kodim's personnel to the target group had been implemented optimally. It is line with the Kasad Act 508/XII/2003 concerning The Five Territorial Capabilities (Method) which is stated that the soldier of Indonesian army should be able to provide information for society both directly and indirectly through mass communication and also directly through communication among individual and groups. The submitted information must be relevant, useful, timely and valid. [17]

Additionally, optimal distribution or delivery of communication may lead to optimal implementation. This effort is considered excellent because the fundamental concept of carrying out the prevention of terrorism which is categorized as Military Operations Other Than War is National Defence. As a concept and doctrine of defence, national defence is an element that must exist in every heart of the people of a country. [7]

#### 2) Consistency

The implementation of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 related to communication has been conducted systematically, aligning with the established phases of policy implementation. Consistency is essential to ensure that the established policies are dependable and do not create confusion among policy implementers, target groups, and associated stakeholders. Inconsistent instructions or directives might lead to confusion among field implementers. Social communication conducted during peacetime consists of a sequence of activities that include planning, preparation, implementation, and termination. [7]

#### 3) Clarity

The target group has comprehensively comprehended the application of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 concerning communication. Regarding information clarity, policy implementors often obscure the aim of the information for personal gain by interpreting it according to their individual understandings and biases. To address this scenario, it is essential to establish explicit objectives and standards, eliminate ambiguous possibilities, implement rigorous procedures, and utilize comprehensive reporting channels. [9]

The communication process is significantly enhanced by the conveyance of information using language that is comprehensible to the intended audience. The Babinsa Kodim 0831/East Surabaya conducts social communication in the regional language, specifically Javanese with the Surabaya dialect. It enables profound communication, allowing the community to comprehend the transmitted information effortlessly.

### Resources

#### 1) Human resources

The execution of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 concerning resources encountered challenges in human resources regarding both quality and quantity that remain unaddressed. Policy implementation frequently falters, partly due to the presence of staff who do not meet established standards or exhibit unprofessionalism in their respective disciplines. Purwanto stated that the substantial number of human resources required for a company to effectively fulfill its responsibilities is not a fixed formula. The appropriate number of human resources for an organization is predominantly dictated by the tasks it must accomplish. The complexity of a policy directly correlates with the volume of human resources required for its implementation. The more complex a policy is, the greater the quantity of human resources fulfilled in order to carry out implementation tasks and vice versa. [2]

#### 2) Budget resources

The implementation of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 regarding budget resources was determined to be unfulfilled. George Edward III stated that the limited quality of services intended for the community is attributable to current funding constraints. Furthermore, he asserted that the inadequate incentives provided to implementers are the primary reason for the failure of program execution. The success of policy execution will be contingent upon the availability of constrained budgetary resources. The ineffective execution of the program, coupled with constrained financial means, may lead to a diminished attitude among policy implementers.

#### 3) Equipment resources

The execution of Kasad rule 37-02/XII/2012 concerning equipment resources was deemed inadequate. The lack of this equipment is not insignificant, since it may lead to the failure of policy execution.

Makinde's research on the identification of challenges in the implementation process in developing nations indicates that the failure of policy implementation in Ghana is attributed, among other factors, to a lack of technology (equipment) and insufficient human resources with the appropriate capacity. [10]

#### 4) Authority resources

The execution of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 concerning the resources of authority has been executed effectively. This aligns with the criteria outlined in the provision of social communication. The responsibilities in executing social communication align with the responsibilities of each official, beginning with the Commander of the Kodam, followed by the Commander of Korem, the Commander of Kodim, the Commander of Koramil, and the Commander of Non-territorial units. Moreover, Sulila clarified that this authority will differ in both the structure of the program and its execution, as well as the requisite abilities pertinent to the designated responsibilities within the scope of the authority exercised. [5]

### *Disposition or Attitude of the Implementer*



### 1) Staffing Bureaucracy

The implementation of Kasad regulation 37-02/XII/2012 concerning dispositions continues to encounter obstacles in bureaucratic placement that remain unaddressed. The assignment of personnel by Dandim 0831/East Surabaya aligns with optimal conditions. At the Koramil level, the assignment of Babinsa is not determined by specific criteria but rather aligned with the available manpower count. This still fails to satisfy the implementation success criteria.

George Edward III asserts that genuine impediments will arise from the implementer's attitude or inclination towards policy execution if the available human resources fail to enact the policies anticipated by superiors. Consequently, the selection and designation of staff responsible for policy implementation must involve individuals who are committed to the established policy.

### 2) Incentive

No incentives are offered to the officers of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya for executing social communication, particularly with the early detection and prevention of radicalism in the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya region. Sulila asserts that to address the issue of policy implementers' attitudes, it is advisable to employ an approach that involves energizing them through incentives. Incentives from policymakers will influence the actions of policy implementers, as individuals inherently operate according to their interests. The inclusion of specific fees or profit is anticipated to motivate implementers to execute instructions or directives effectively. This is conducted to fulfil personal or organizational objectives.

#### *Bureaucratic Structure.*

### 1) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

No written Standard Operating Procedure exists for social communication concerning early prevention and detection in the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya region. This does not align with the expected standards of policy execution. Sulila asserts that the presence of the SOP is crucial for governing the operational workflow in the program's execution. The SOP equates the actions of individuals in complicated, large organizations, where their application can achieve a significant degree of flexibility alongside the enforcement of fair regulations.

### 2) Fragmentation

The execution of Kasad Regulation 37-02/XII/2012 in the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya region regarding fragmentation has been conducted with optimal efficacy. This corresponds to the social communication provision, which consistently underlines the importance of cooperating with relevant agencies. The participation of the Three Pillars of Surabaya City—comprising the Army, the Police, and local government officials—coupled with effective coordination, is indeed suitable for executing social communication initiatives. Rahmat asserts that prolonged fragmentation will exacerbate the burden of policy execution. Furthermore, a deficient organizational structure and inadequate expertise within the implementing agency will result in implementation failure.

[11]

## 6. Conclusion

Following an analysis of the research findings in relation to the foundational theories, it can be concluded, in accordance with George Edwards III's policy implementation theory (1980), that the execution of Kasad Regulation 37-02/XII/2012 concerning the early detection and prevention of radicalism in the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya region is as follows:

- 1) The communication factor of social communication in the East Surabaya region is functioning effectively. Information regarding the early prevention and detection of radicalism has been effectively and consistently communicated by Kodim officers to the target group. The community, as the target group, has comprehensively comprehended the material.
- 2) The resource factor in social communication activities in the East Surabaya region is not operating optimally. Kodim 0831/East Surabaya is experiencing a shortage in human resources, both in terms of quantity and quality. Furthermore, budget and equipment resources have failed to satisfy field requirements. Nevertheless, the authority has been operating efficiently regarding resources, as unit commanders have been granted complete autonomy to implement social communication policies.
- 3) The disposition factor or the attitude of the implementer in the social communication activities in the East Surabaya region has been relatively effective. The deployment of Babinsa has been well managed despite challenges arising from their limited numbers. Similarly, the initiative was unsuccessful due to the absence of supplementary incentives to promote social communication activities. The TNI's budget for social communication is sourced centrally from the state budget.
- 4) The bureaucratic structure factor in social communication activities in the East Surabaya area has been functioning well. Regarding SOPs, the execution of activities is currently unavailable; nevertheless, in terms of fragmentation, coordination with other organisational units, including the Police and local government, has been functioning effectively.

## 7. Recommendation

Recommendations for optimising the implementation of Kasad Regulation 37-02/XII/2012 in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya are as follows:

### 1) Enabling Three Pillars Plus Activity

To enhance the efficacy of the Three Pillars activity, it is expected that participation should extend beyond the three pillars to include religious leaders, youth leaders, and other

community leaders who collaborate in gathering information from the lower strata of society. Furthermore, it is carried out not only in restaurants, cafes, residences, or conference rooms but also at religious schools, Islamic boarding schools, and academic campuses. Considering the constrained time available for socializing and interaction among individuals in urban locations due to job responsibilities, it is expected that the Three Pillars activity will also be implemented beyond working hours or office settings. Consequently, the existing Three Pillars activity requires enhancement to the Three Pillars Plus activity. The advantages encompass an increase in the number of participants, the enlargement of the gathering location, and the duration of the meeting. This will undoubtedly be highly beneficial and efficient in detecting and preventing early signs or actions of radicalism inside society.

#### 2) Expanding the Territorial Network Distance Map of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya

The lack of personnel and equipment in Kodim 0831/East Surabaya adversely impacts attempts to deal with radicalism in the area. To surmount the constraints of personnel and equipment, the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya apparatus must enhance the current territorial network distance map to facilitate the monitoring of developments in their designated areas. The territorial network distance map, serving as an extension of the territorial apparatus, encompasses both formal and informal partners, so addressing all societal strata. The Kodim 0831/East Surabaya apparatus is capable of both extending the territorial network map and sustaining it, ensuring that partners consistently give information to detect and avoid early signs or actions of radicalism within the community.

#### 3) Establishing In Group-In Groups on Social Media Associated with Kodim 0831 / East Surabaya Personnel

Officials of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya can leverage their tight partnerships in the designated areas by establishing In Group-In Group on social media to gather information regarding ongoing developments and emerging issues in the East Surabaya area. The established In Group resembles Multi-Level Marketing (MLM), allowing the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya personnel to remain indirectly involved. Nevertheless, utilising the members of an In Group suffices to maintain communication with the subordinate In Groups. It is expected that the information generated inside the lowest tier of the In Group will sequentially disseminate to the higher tiers, ultimately reaching the Kodim 0831/East Surabaya apparatus. Moreover, the officers of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya evaluated the received information and communicated it to the higher command for further action.

#### 4) Enhancing the Capability of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya Personnel in Communication and Territorial Management

Officials of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya must comprehend communication approaches to ensure the proper execution of social communication, hence achieving the desired objectives. Consequently, officers of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya must re-

ceive technical briefings from communication experts, encompassing communication knowledge, active listening, appreciation of others' recommendations and reactions, and the ability to influence communicators through academic methodologies.

Furthermore, the officers of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya must enhance their territorial management competencies concerning data collecting, data tabulation, and regional classification to facilitate early detection and prevention of extremism. The Kodim 0831/ East Surabaya apparatus must be aware of and capable of monitoring and supervising the community in the assisted area, which is classified as susceptible to radical ideologies. This includes community members who frequently access radical websites, those returning to East Surabaya after working as migrant labourers in Middle Eastern countries, and former terrorist prisoners.

#### 5) Allocating the budget for routine and special incentives for informal social communication

Officials of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya (Babinsa) experience inadequate operational financial support when addressing the responsibilities of a Babinsa, particularly in urban areas. Consequently, it is essential to allocate a budget for regular social media activity and provide special incentives for social communication to ensure the efficient implementation of the policy and the achievement of established targets.

#### 6) Developing a Standard Operating Procedure for social communication at Kodim 0831/East Surabaya

The SOP on social communication enables Kodim 0831/East Surabaya to handle schedules and activities more effectively. The implementation of social communication allows for the effective and successful application of SOPs in compliance with the requirements of Kodim 0831/East Surabaya under any circumstances.

## Abbreviations

MLM	Multi Level Marketing
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia

## Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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