

Research Article

Socio-political Struggle and the Problem of State Building in Ukraine in the 60's of the XVII Century

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Abstract

60-80s of the 17th century. entered the history of Ukraine as the "Age of Ruin". Unfortunately, the heirs of B. Khmelnytskyi could not successfully complete his endeavors. The beginning of the Age of Ruin was the removal of Yu. Khmelnytskyi from power in the fall of 1657. I. Vyhovskyi and his supporters actually carried out a coup d'état. In the post of hetman, I. Vyhovsky pursued an anti-Moscow policy, defeated the pro-Moscow uprising of the Cossacks (1658), and sent Russian troops to Konotop (1659). He concluded an agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Hadiachy (1658), which was ratified by the Polish Diet. This agreement too limited the rights of Ukraine, which reduced Vyhovsky's support among the Cossacks. In October 1659 he was removed from the hetmanship at the "Black Council" and returned power to Yuri Khmelnytskyi. After that, he was in the Polish civil service. In 1664, by order of his personal enemy - the then hetman of Right Bank Ukraine, Pavlo Teteri - he was arrested, baselessly accused of treason against the Polish king and shot. The formal reason for these actions was Yu. Khmelnytskyi's youth, illness, and weakness. The real reasons are the deterioration of the state's geopolitical situation, the strengthening of social opposition in society, the struggle of individual elite groups for power, weak support for the idea of hereditary monarchy, etc.

Keywords

National Liberation War, Polish Nobility, Rzeczpospolita, Ukraine, Universals, Zaporozhie Army, B. Khmelnytsky, I. Vyhovsky

1. Introduction

The second half of the XVII century characterized by special features of Ukraine's development: betrayals, riots, discord were the daily life of the Ukrainian people. There is no doubt that some of these signs are private in nature and due to subjective reasons: strife we have for the hetman mace, mutual hostility among Cossack officers and others. But apart from this chaos, the history of Ukraine captures still a mess, Social character in, which is manifested in the form of separate disorder. Such "staggers", "riots", "arbitrariness", as

they are called by the Cossack chronicles, took place exclusively on the initiative of the Cossack officers. Among the historical events, special a scientific interest - People protest against the attempts of the ruler, not dependent on the will of the people, although there were in the same area and were far for mass understanding or even unfavorable to the masses. At the same time, such phenomena provide an opportunity to identify and solve the problems that the people tried to implement in their public life, to identify the people's ideal that

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was to prevail in public life.

Analysis of recent research and publications.

The problem of Ukrainian state formation in the middle of the 17th century. in modern Ukrainian and not only historiography was and is being investigated. To many researchers of different times applied for a detailed coverage of its individual aspects, in particular: M. Hpyshchyskyi, H. Binoypadov, V. Kulchyskyi, P. Lepisevich, Yu. Micyk, L. Ppitsak, B. Cmolii, B. Ctepankov, V. Sukhonos, C. Ploxyi, M. Pasichnyk, Ya. Fedopyk, T. Chyxlі6, N. Yakovenko et al [5-8, 17, 20-25]. Thanks to painstaking We have 6 agaty opyc and topical works of scientistsevents, phenomena and processes that took place on Ukrainian territory at that time, and the analysis was carried out from an overview of the tasks of these branches of technology, and the limits how were these studies carried out: histories, rights, public administration, etc. With that in mind, the purpose of the post is to highlight features of state-making and law-making activities of Ukrainian hetmans in the period of the 60s of the 17th century.

The main purpose of the study is a comprehensive study of this topic on the basis of generalization and critical rethinking of all available historical documents and published Ukrainian and foreign sources; identify major social, political and state processes taking place in Ukraine in the 50th 's. XVII century. as a result of the national liberation war, and highlighting the mistakes that led to the Ruin.

Using a variety of printed and archival materials, works of domestic and foreign scientists, the author set himself the task to explore:

- 1) the main socio-political results of the national liberation war of 1648-1657, including the changes that took place in the socio-political structure of Ukrainian society;
- 2) the socio-political situation of the Ukrainian Cossack state, focusing on the coverage of hostilities in Ukraine in the 50's, which caused the destructive processes;
- 3) differences in the political orientation and aspirations of various groups of Cossack officers;
- 4) the internal life of the Ukrainian people and the main activities;
- 5) assessment of the Treaty of Hadiach from the point of view of the interests of the Ukrainian Cossack officers;

Disclosure of the specifics of the subject became possible due to the general principles of scientific knowledge: systemics (consider each social group, trace internal and external relations), objectivity (ability to critically comprehend certain biased provisions and stamps of Soviet historiography about the Ruin), historicism (trace the history of Ukrainian statehood in a long period of time in all the diversity of its development), complexity (to investigate and analyze various objective and subjective factors that influenced the activities of the Hetman and the Cossack officers). Research tools include a set of general and special research methods. Of the general scientific methods, the most widely used are deduc-

tive, inductive, analysis and synthesis, and modeling.

2. Socio-political Processes in Ukraine in the Middle of the XVII Century

At the beginning of the 17th century, even under Hetman P. Sahaidachny, the Ukrainian Cossacks began to pursue broader national interests, defending the Orthodox faith. But besides that, he fought for his rights and interests and defended already quite clear national or state ideals. It is then that the national-state idea begins to be born. Even the representatives of the bourgeois fraternities, among whom the idea of the struggle for the Ukrainian nation first appeared, understood the national struggle only as a struggle for religious interests: religious notions were then identified with national notions. Of course, under such conditions, neither Khmelnytsky nor his closest supporters, mostly also the officers of the registered and Zaporozhie army as organizers of the national liberation movement, could set themselves any broader tasks than improving the existence of the Cossack state. B. Khmelnytsky had no plans at the time to tear Ukraine away from Poland and create Ukrainian state. Educated in Polish schools and imbued with the spirit of Polish culture and Polish legal system, he could not get carried away with any other idea than the struggle for certain changes in the situation of the Ukrainian population on the basis of Polish models and within the Polish state. "Khmelnytsky," writes V. Antonovych, "did not imagine any other social order than the one in which he grew up and which he only knew. He wanted such a way that, getting rid of the common nobility and religious oppression, hiding only dependence on the king, it was possible to create from the Cossacks, and especially from the sergeant, a kind of his own, native nobility. In the time of B. Khmelnytsky, all people, even a little noticeable by their education, seeking independence, understood it as Polish state forms - only with national elements." [1].

Having started a national liberation war, which in some respects resembled the German movements of the Reformation, Ukraine experienced it as the so-called peasant war, as the main driving force in it was the peasantry. As a hundred years before in Germany and in Ukraine since 1648 at the head of the movement was a layer of petty gentry, military landowners. The Ukrainian starshyna differed little socially from the Cossacks. In the first news about the national liberation war of Khmelnytsky we come across a message about the Cossack nobility, which "building freedom, motherland, and struggling of Cossacks against their Polish neighbors" [2].

In the German social movements of the Reformation, class antagonisms quickly made it impossible to unite the peasantry and the petty gentry. It was different in Ukraine. Not strong enough "citizenship" of the peasant masses to the lords and replenishment of the new leading stratum of the

Cossacks with such elements, which even before the national liberation war "went to the dam", formed the ground for spreading the idea of equal society "without slave and without lord."

At the first stage of his activity, Khmelnytsky could not decide for a long time in his political plans for the reconstruction of the Commonwealth. He tried to strengthen the power of the Polish king in order to limit the tyranny of the magnates as well as the throne to put a non-Catholic monarch on the Polish throne to "protect the liberties of the Orthodox."

After defeating the Polish army near Zhovti Vody and Korsun, then near Pylyava, reaching as far as Lviv and Zamosht, B. Khmelnytsky, instead of inflicting a decisive strike on the enemy, hesitated and terminated the offensive. He saw that his speech unexpectedly developed into a national liberation war, and that course of events did not fit within the limits of the plans with which he initiated the movement. At that time King Wladyslaw of Poland died, and the Poles elected Jan Casimir King, who agreed to make peace on seemingly mutually beneficial terms. Therefore, having received a letter from Casimir with all the promises, Khmelnytsky told his ambassador that he now "recognizes his citizenship to the king and returns to Zaporozhye to anticipate for delegates to maintain a peaceful understanding, additionally, on the way to Zaporozhye he will not provoke any riots."

Obviously, that fact is to explain why B. Khmelnytsky did not support the anti-Polish movement in Eastern Galicia during his offensive against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Only later did Bohdan Khmelnytsky accept the idea of creating a separate Ukrainian state. In the autumn of 1648, retreating from Galicia, he arrived in Kiev. The higher clergymen and the population of the city solemnly greeted him as a national hero and defender of the Orthodox Church. That solemn meeting and conversation with the educated representatives of the Ukrainian population of Kyiv made an impression on the Hetman. He realized that the time had come to fight for the complete liberation of the entire Ukrainian people and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.

Negotiations with the Polish delegates, who soon arrived at the Hetman's, did not lead to anything. Khmelnytsky no longer wanted to talk about narrowly Cossack affairs, he stated emphatically: "I have already proved what I never thought about, and then I will prove what I thought: I will liberate the Ukrainian people from the captivity of the Lyah (the Polish)! And even before I fought for my harm and wrong, now I will fight for our Orthodox faith. In this war, all the peasants will support me, in Lublin, in Krakow. And I will not turn away from the objective, because that is our right hand!" [3].

3. Problems of Socio-economic Development

Ukraine and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth commenced preparation for a new war. To fight against the Polish nobility inspired a large number of the masses. People from all social backgrounds were joining the army: peasants, burghers, Cossacks, and the clergymen. B. Khmelnytsky's army was turning into a powerful force again. However, according to some scientific notions the opportune moment for the beginning of the national liberation war was lost. After the first failures, the Polish nobility managed to gather new forces against Ukraine. In addition, the Tatars were unreliable allies and betrayed B. Khmelnytsky more than once at the crucial moments of the struggle. Therefore, the fight against the Poles was protracted and did not give the desired results. First, as noted, it came to the Zboriv compromise agreement, and then to the even more difficult Bila Tserkva agreement.

In fact, the first stage of Khmelnytsky region - the period of successes and victories - resulted in the Zboriv agreement. In the next stage, until his death, the Hetman and his followers were forced to continue the struggle, overcoming great difficulties in defending the Cossack state. The Treaty of Zboriv proved the military strength of the Commonwealth was not ruined. But the worst thing was that the Treaty of Zboriv spread distrust between the leading Cossacks and the ordinary Cossacks together with the peasantry.

The mentioned issue was to be linked to the economic factor of the Cossacks. Another Russian historian M. Pokrovsky noted that the land ownership of the Cossack class in Ukraine before and after the national liberation war turned to be bourgeois one. The "bourgeoisie" of Cossack property consisted in the way of using the land, in the way of producing products. The Cossacks themselves worked and employed hired labor. The spread of hired labor in Ukraine at that time is mentioned in the chronicle of Samovydet that during the so-called Zbarazh war "it was hard to hire". The monetary economy before the Khmelnytsky period was already widespread in Ukraine. A visible sign of that event was the influx of Jews into Ukraine. The magnates turned to Jewish factors to intensify the economy and to enhance taxes imposed on the estates and property. Not only usurious capital had its roots in Ukraine, but also industrial capital: the utilization of Ukraine's forest resources, processing of agricultural products (vodka, beer), as well as agriculture and livestock for export. [4]. The Chronicle of Samovydet includes a number of professions of that time workers in Ukraine. The "proletariat" (in the words of the Seer "laziness") consisted of breweries, winemakers, cemeteries, mercenaries, shepherds [5].

The importance of the cities should not be underestimated, especially in Western Ukraine. The Ukrainian bourgeoisie took an active part in the uprising of B. Khmelnytsky. The national liberation war differs from the peasant war of the

Reformation period, where the patricians were against the peasant movement and supported the princes. The Ukrainian bourgeoisie was culturally and politically developed and quite nationally conscious. It organized fraternities and schools under them. High sublimity of religious feelings, the desire for social justice characterized the Ukrainian bourgeoisie. The most difficult problem in the policy of the Cossack government was the peasants' issue. The Commonwealth, with its mass participation in the national liberation war, gave it the character of a real revolution, and B. Khmelnytsky himself acknowledged this. "Peasants are our right hand," said the Cossack Hetman. However, the peasantry often led B. Khmelnytsky not where he wanted. That is why Adam Kysil wrote in his letter to Chancellor Ossolinsky: "Peasants are his (B. Khmelnytsky), from whom he depends [6].

Relations with the peasantry is a fundamental topic for understanding the whole period of Khmelnytsky and Vyhovshchyna. The peasant movement in the uprising was massive, especially in the Dnieper, where the "obedience" of the Commonwealth barely took root. The Chronicle of the Seer is somewhat hyperbolic, but mostly truthfully describes the mass and unity of this movement: "And so the people of the Commonwealth in Ukraine, hearing about the demolition of the crown and Hetmans, knew" [7].

Having destroyed the gentry's property with incredible cruelty, the peasantry neglected all duties and duties towards anyone. Almost everyone enlisted in the Cossacks. Despite neither the monastic shrines nor the patriotic merits of the Orthodox nobility, that supported the Zaporozhie Army, the peasants divided the nobility and monastic lands, plowed, sowed them and harvested. Here is how Pavlo Alepsky describes the life and work of the people of the Cossack country on the liberated land: "The Cossacks, having ruled in this country, divided the land among themselves and now cut down this forest (cultivated by Polish magnates), burn the roots and sow the land with grain. The forest was cut down, the roots were burned, the land was plowed and fields were made in its place. This is what the inhabitants of this whole country did... The Cossacks, having seized the forests, divided the land, made fences and borders, and cut down the forest day and night".

Having got rid of the burdens established by the nobility, according to P. Alepsky, all "subjects of the Cossack country know neither taxes, nor hot money, nor tithes...".

Productive forces of Ukraine began to develop rapidly P. Alepsky describes the technique of water mills in Ukraine, stupas, falushi, distilleries, breweries and more. He enthusiastically describes the diligence of the population of the Cossack state. The political system created in Ukraine and progress were visible to the naked eye. P. Alepsky, who was in Ukraine five years after the national liberation war, notes that many beautiful churches have been built in cities and villages in Ukraine "since the reign of Hetman Zinovy Khmel."

The majority of the Ukrainian peasantry did not want to hear about the return of "habitual obedience" to pre-war relations.

How did B. Khmelnytsky feel about the moods and desires of the peasant masses? Did he understand the importance of the social question for the future of the Ukrainian state? Facts and documents show that the matter of relations with the peasantry repeatedly arose before the hetman as one of the main problems of the Ukrainian state of the XVII century. It should be noted that despite everything, Khmelnytsky felt like a "noble-born" Cossack, who did not like the desire of society to completely demolish the foundations of the previous social system.

In fact, at the beginning of the war B. Khmelnytsky tried to distance himself from the peasantry. He even warns his enemies that he has strength, an army and it cannot be said that there are no evil among the good."[8]. *The successes that Khmelnytsky achieved in the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became possible thanks to the peasantry.*

Khmelnytsky profoundly understood the significance of the union of the Cossacks with the peasantry and stated that he would not back down from it. With their mass participation in the war, the peasantry forced the hetman to take into account their needs and requirements. There were cases when dissatisfied with Khmelnytsky's instability, the peasant masses declared when they would choose "another hetman, and he, Bohdan, as he wished." [9]. Hoping for an agreement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, B. Khmelnytsky happened, retreated from the blacks and even helped the Polish lords to "punish the peasants" who "did not want to be obedient to their masters" - read in the universal of 20.09.1650. [10]. When hopes for an understanding with the Poles did not materialize, the same Khmelnytsky called on the mob to march against the Commonwealth: "We order our good fellows to come to me at once and come to me, where they will be, against the enemies of our enemies, so that we are in bed. our houses were not acquired. Take your bags with you: we will have a lot of wealth when we return" [11].

Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his associates, organizing the internal system in Ukraine, were guided by the policy of dividing society into classes. Therefore, caring for the protection of the rights and interests of the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky forgot about his "right hand" - the peasants, who formed the bulk of the insurgent army. Already in July 1648, when the Cossack delegates in connection with the election of a new king submitted to the Polish Sejm in Warsaw their explanations about the reasons for the uprising, they were only about the oppression suffered by the Polish regime Cossacks, clergy and Orthodox faith, but not a word was mentioned about the peasantry. The same occurred near Zborov, when due to the betrayal of the Tatar khan had to conclude a peace treaty with the Commonwealth: the provisions of this treaty were based on the condition "that the Cossack was a Cossack, and a slave a slave." [12].

It is well known that on the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv, an autonomous region was formed within the Polish state, which included the current Kyiv region, Chernihiv region, Poltava region and part of Podillya and Volyn. This area was under the rule of the Cossack hetman and had its own army. At the same time, the entire ancient social system was preserved here: except for 40,000 registered Cossacks, all other Ukrainian peasants had to return to the position of lordly subjects and serve as serfs. The royal administration had to return to its ancient places just as the lords returned to their estates.

The Treaty of Zboriv did not violate the social order that the peasant masses opposed. Therefore, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who called on the peasants to revolt, now had to take strict measures to implement the treaty - up to "punishment on the throat", as stated in his universals, to force the peasants to obey.

However, no punishment could curb the peasants who did not want to agree that "God himself from the beginning of the world appointed them to be subjects, not masters." "Of the numerous treatises of the Polish government with the Cossacks, which aimed to return Eastern Ukraine to Polish land tenure at the cost of concessions in political and cultural life," wrote Hrushevsky, "none could be realized primarily due to the invincible opposition of the masses." [13].

Under such conditions, the resolution of the Treaty of Zboriv on the return of the bulk of the peasantry to its previous position in many cases remained on paper. It is quite possible that it sharply divided the Ukrainian forces that had previously opposed the common enemy. This break between B. Khmelnytsky and the lower strata had severe consequences for the further course of the Cossack struggle for the Ukrainian state. B. Khmelnytsky's struggle against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth sharply split into two periods: the peasant-bourgeois-Cossack revolution of 1648-1649 and the purely Cossack campaigns of the following years.

4. Contradictions in Ukrainian Society

Having liberated from Polish rule, the peasantry and the Cossacks believed that all estates and privileges in Ukraine were "abolished by the Cossack sword." In fact, in the Cossack state, as already noted, there was a previous division of society into subordinates and lords. "And just as the notion of the gentry of the Commonwealth," wrote Vyacheslav Lypynsky, "became synonymous with the Polish state, so the notion of the Zaporozhie Cossack army became synonymous with the newly formed Ukrainian state under B. Khmelnytsky." "What is the Commonwealth? And we are also the Commonwealth!" - Cossack representatives declared to the Polish commissars at the beginning of the national liberation war" [14]. Of course, such a social system, which to the smallest detail resembled the Polish nobility, was attractive only to the Cossacks. However, the ordinary Cossacks, to-

gether with the Zaporozhian Sich and the peasantry, immediately began to oppose the restoration of the nobility in Ukraine. Therefore, after the Treaty of Zboriv, Zaporizhzhya Sich stands apart from the general regimental organization of "urban Ukraine". Without sharing the domestic policy of B. Khmelnytsky, Sich continues to live in its own separate democratic system, becoming a border stronghold on the Tatar border and preserving its internal autonomy.

The anti-Polish struggle led by B. Khmelnytsky was basically a struggle for the seizure of power by the Cossack class from the Polish large landowners and the Polish nobility in general. However, this process of transition of dominant influence in society from one stratum to another, as shown by the example of the neighboring Moscow state, could not end quickly. In Moscow, the struggle of the nobility with the nobility lasted almost half a century, and some Russian historians believe the end of the process of formation of the nobility only in the period of Peter I. "It took time," wrote M. Hrushevsky, "to break the force of popular resistance" against the creation of a new ruling class of Cossack officers. It took some time for a calmer and freer existence. However, this was not the case. The newly created Cossack state had to live in conditions of constant wars with neighboring states, which closely watched it from all sides and tried to use every difficult situation in the Cossack state to their advantage. In addition, the separation and antagonism between the ruling Cossacks and the lower strata of society during B. Khmelnytsky's lifetime were quite clear and the peasant and Cossack revolts almost did not subside. And only thanks to the great authority and organizational skill B. Khmelnytsky managed to restrain internal differences within the Ukrainian society and not to allow them to go beyond the borders, dangerous for the existence of the state itself" [15].

The further away, the more intensified Ukraine's struggle with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In search of salvation from Polish rule, Ukraine was forced to enter into an alliance with Moscow, but this did not save the Ukrainian state.

Moving away from the Commonwealth, Ukraine found itself in an economic blockade. Once lively trade with Western Europe across the Baltic Sea was terminated. Under such conditions, it was impossible to realize the great harvests that Pavlo Alepsky saw in Ukraine: "We could see all kinds of crops the height of a man, like a huge sea in length and width." [16]. The harvested bread was fed to cattle, pigs, and poultry, and processed into beer and vodka. Due to the impossibility to sell the products of farmers in foreign markets, Ukraine resorts to subsistence farming. In order to purchase funds for the maintenance of troops and other needs, the Cossack government was forced to rent duties to merchants. Trade relations with Moscow could not weaken the Ukrainian economic crisis, because the type of economy of the Moscow state was lower in structure than the economy of Ukraine. In addition, Moscow as a supplier of raw materials to Western Europe could only be a competitor.

This situation could be overcome only through trade relations with Western Europe. However, the road across the Black Sea was closed; Ukraine received only salt from the shores of the Black Sea, and supplied "living goods" to the Crimea and Turkey.

The way through Wallachia was long and dangerous. Therefore, the Cossack government was forced to look for ways through the Commonwealth. But the path of agreement is impossible, so the state of war continued. The fatality of such a solution to the "Polish question" for the interests of Ukraine is repeatedly found in the words of B. Khmelnytsky and his entourage. Proponents of the hetman believed that "although, they say, the royal majesty will reconcile with the Polish king, but you, the hetman, will never agree with him: either you will destroy them, or you will perish."

With the return of Ukraine to natural forms of economy, the Ukrainian state-military apparatus had to be organized on the basis of the ancient "bread-feeding". Here is one example that illustrates the naturalization of Ukraine's economy in those days. In 1659 the nobleman Lukasz Nosatsevich sold the land in the Chernihiv region to Karpov Mokrievich and for it received "800 golden Polish beams and, in particular, flour of rye flour of eight octaves, wheat flour of twenty, millet of eight octaves, the price of which was also four coins at that time. wheat at the same price and millet, which, having counted the flour in the same government, made the same price". Due to lack of money, people were forced to introduce barter trade, to pay in kind. The fact of payment indicates a crisis of money circulation, which was permanent in the Cossack state. That is why, for example, B. Khmelnytsky sold state estates, which became the lands of the nobility in Ukraine: lying and with the subjects on the grounds of customs, judging by the court in Kiev standing, as the deceased Mr. Gruzevich kept and used and took all the proper belongings", - said in the universal of 15.07.1656. Such universals of the Cossack hetman, of course, caused", Which became free as a result of the national liberation war.

Was serfdom and "obedience" of the commonwealth generate a need caused by the economic condition of Ukraine? Was the feudal nobility really a necessary and indispensable part of social production in the Khmelnytsky region, or did it play a useful organizational role in the national economy? Historical sources give a negative answer to this.

Serfdom and "obedience" relations arose mainly due to the economic dependence of the small peasant on the owner, who gave him inventory, borrowed grain, gave him land, and so on. Especially in the process of transition from forms of subsistence farming to money without credit, the peasant economy could not take a step. In these circumstances, the lord was the organizer of the economy and the defender of agricultural labor, because land ownership was associated with conscription.

We can agree with the arguments of V. Smoliy and V. Stepankov that important transformations in agrarian relations, crafts and trade, changes in the social structure of

society, political system were deeply progressive, as they created conditions for the development of productive forces, "bourgeois" relations. originated in the first half of the XVII century. However, their implementation required favorable not only domestic but also foreign policy conditions. And it was their absence that played a tragic role in the history of Ukraine. As already mentioned, the return of the national economy in Ukraine to natural forms of management and exchange (due to isolation from Western European markets) had a catastrophic effect on the entire socio-political structure of the Cossack state.

The revolutionary process in Ukraine was interrupted. Bohdan Khmelnytsky and his successors were forced to impose from above the "usual obedience" of the common lands to the new owners. The Cossack state, in order not to disintegrate, built a military-administrative apparatus on the basis of constant, hated "obedience". This was a great danger and threat to the Cossack state, because the hatred of the commonwealth for serfdom, which was abolished by the "Cossack sword" and now restored, was transferred to the state that allowed serfdom and imposed "obedience" by force.

B. Khmelnytsky's authority among the masses was extremely great. He sought to seize all state power, he was, in fact, a dictator, a "Russian autocrat," as he sometimes called himself. B. Khmelnytsky managed to hold on to his role as the sole ruler due to his high personal qualities: "charisma is the so-called extraordinary property through which he (person) is evaluated as endowed with supernatural or superhuman powers, as a god-sent or exemplary leader." [17].

The subjects of the Zaporozhian Army treated B. Khmelnytsky's personality typically "charismatically". He was "God-given" to them. Respect for the hetman prevails not only in the immediate vicinity of B. Khmelnytsky, but also on the periphery of the Cossack state. Ukrainians also showed this attitude to the hetman to foreigners. In particular, to the accusations of the boyar Rtishchev and the Duma deacon Almaz Ivanov that the government of Bohdan Khmelnytsky accepts, contrary to the conditions, foreign ambassadors even "with a nasty demise", without informing Moscow, Hetman's ambassadors Teterya and his comrades said; only de it is necessary to say about everything to the hetman himself in the face..., and the name de of all that to the hetman cannot be uttered" [18].

The Cossack officer did not dare to question B. Khmelnytsky's life about the content of the "March articles". Only after his death on August 25, 1657, at the Cossack council, "the initial people and the whole army, listening to the tsar's letter, spoke among themselves to the hetman's son Yuri Khmelnytsky and the clerk Ivan Vygovsky, so that they could show the whole army Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian army were beaten on the forehead... and we, with the whole army of what the great emperor was against our military petition... welcomed and are still invisible" [19].

At the Cossack council in Chyhyryn after Khmelnytsky's

death, "a call from the common Cossacks called for the young Khmelnytsky and asked him to justify the government in his father's place." In the eyes of the "blacks", Yuri Khmelnytsky's minor status was not an obstacle to his election as hetman, because it is important for the blacks that Yuras was from the Khmelnytsky family: "The fame was, but Khmelnytsky was the hetman."

Khmelnytsky's plans were hindered not only by accidental facts, such as the death of his eldest, very gifted son Timosh and Yuri's youth and inability to govern the Cossack state, but also by external circumstances. In particular, it was not in Moscow's interests to strengthen the Khmelnytsky family, the popularity and authority of this surname. The Moscow government knew that Khmelnytsky's successor in the hetman's government should be his son Yuri (this was reported by Fyodor Buturlin). However, Moscow was interested in having hetmanship in Ukraine, at least for a while. It supports the "electoral principle" in Ukraine and asks whether all formalities have been followed in electing a new hetman. Upon learning of Khmelnytsky's death, the Moscow government sent Kikin to Ukraine with a letter to the "Zaporizhzhya Army": to him Yuri to one is not specified, and sent) he from the tsar's majesty with the diploma to all army of Zaporozhye, and to give to him that tsarist majesty the diploma is ordered to all army of Zaporozhye, and to the Hetman's son and to the clerk to Vygovsky not to go".

5. Conclusions

The state apparatus formed in Ukraine during the revolutionary events was not homogeneous in its composition. This apparatus did not have any traditions, this inertia of the historical process, which allows even weaker organizations to stay afloat for a long time.

The constituent elements of the ruling military apparatus were not marked by high moral and political qualities. Khmelnytsky's powerful individuality restrained the egocentric aspirations of the Cossack officers, although, as is well known, they were not always successful. When the old hetman died, even among the "significant" there was a split into groups. It is in the discord of the ruling coercive apparatus that the germ of Ruin lies.

Of course, B. Khmelnytsky could not restore the old system of gentry domination over the commonwealth peasants. But since he returned some of their former owners their property ("kgrunta vlasnie"), he was forced by separate orders to establish relations between the owners and the peasants in the new circumstances. After the victorious national liberation war, the formula "habitual obedience" could not satisfy the peasants, and therefore, for example, in the universal in the name of the nobleman Nosatsevich B. Khmelnytsky notes: "for that tithe everyone gave".

We fully share the opinion of V. Smoliiy that Bohdan

Khmelnytsky is a historical figure, whose assessment cannot be unambiguous. He was one of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian history: reflecting national interests, made a real breakthrough in domestic policy, united in a single insurgent camp a variety of social forces, organized and led them to overthrow the Polish nobility in Ukraine, stood at the source of the Ukrainian state. However, today, from the height of the XX century, one can see the inconsistency and half-heartedness of the hetman's actions, sometimes the illogicality of his actions, the lack of certain values, and so on. However, all this must be reconciled with the context of the era of that time - ambiguous and contradictory, where old and new orders intertwined, where the medieval worldview still prevailed and only emerged social phenomena characteristic of Europe in the XVII century. Surrounded by enemy forces, the Hetman had to maneuver, compromise, and often abandon his plans and intentions. However, Bohdan Khmelnytsky adhered to the last line of his life, the deep meaning of which was the liberation of his native land from the hated foreign oppression and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, until his last breath. [20].

Author Contributions

Mykhailo Pasichnyk is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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