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# The politicization of European identity in international scientific circles

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**Abstract:** European Union introduces the right of European citizenship with the Maastricht treaty of 1992. This law explains the direct relationship between citizens and the Union, giving European citizens in case of need, especially when outside the European Union, to be represented by any Consulate of a country - member of the Union. This applies in cases when it is different from their national state. Certainly these issues are beyond the powers of an international organization because they are related to constitutional norms of a state that in accordance with the structure of national groups to determine the qualifications of its own, national identity. It is therefore not surprising that the Union was in the process to discuss their own constitution which is still trying to be enacted. On the other hand, the resolution of these questions posed by the need to reach agreement on political integration, as the highest degree of integration between countries. The politicization of European identity in international scientific circles is more of a question as a practical reality versus efforts of the Union for Americanization of European cultural space that imposes globalization to the values of culture, especially the media space. If it's known that the definition of European values is actually determining the global, universal norms and rules of behavior especially regarding human rights, freedoms and the characteristics that occur and determine identities of nations, it is difficult to generalize and practice as European identity. In this direction moves the same qualification of the Union as a community of national and cultural differences. From there, efforts to build the European identity in terms of institutional and financial crisis of the Union are harder to accrue out of the narrow, national frameworks of member states. Old and new 'ladies' the Union, the division of Eastern and Western Europe, the rich north and poor south, is deeply rooted in Western European mental code-category that in later time defines Europe's identity crisis.

**Keywords:** European Citizenship, European Identity, European Values, a Crisis of Identity, Americanization

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## 1. Introduction

The resistance of people to change and things depends on the importance of the change itself that we wish to suggest. Its importance is the safest sign that we are on a good way towards true change – notes in his memoirs one of the founders of the European Union, Jean Monnet<sup>1</sup>. In that sense, the concept of citizenship of the European Union in the scientific circles is more and more understood as a collective memory which the Maastricht Treaty wants to establish as European identity with the Member States. Here arise theoretic questions which in the impossibility to establish the new discourse due to the diversity of identities entail new contemporary scientific dilemmas imposed by contemporary practice. For instance, what does European

identity mean? What are the dimensions of the cultural identity, i.e. how can the relations between the identity and identifier be determined? Does that mean an attempt to disorganize social groups in intercultural communication, a neo-colonist principle instead of self-determination in contacts with other social groups and cultures? Is there a creation of a new paradigm in European pragmatics – from Europe to the cultural and national diversities in the European identity? If so, then this milestone will certainly have a long-term tradition in the foreign denotation toward the Americans or the Balkan people. Among Europeans there exist nations and cultures such as Germans, French, Italians, and Romanians which as an unwritten rule stratify themselves as old and new ladies of Europe.

The problem connected to this dimension of functioning of the European identity arises from the fact that individuals, and even whole social groups in the European

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<sup>1</sup> Europe Our Mutual Home, 2007:69

national states, achieve different social positions because they belong to different subcultures where the signifiers of certain cultural identities can be in collision with one another. Thus, communication of cultural identities in the contemporary cultural policy again leads to disintegration, i.e. a stereotypization which is a direct consequence of, or a reason for, social inequalities, of the gap between the rich North and the poor South and the development and democratization of institutions. Essentially, on the historic scene there is no surpassing the practice of those in power to create and impose the fundamental mechanisms for establishing values contained in cultural identities and according to the principle of hierarchy.

## 2. The Declaration on European Identity as a Political Document

The Declaration on European Identity adopted on the Summit of Member States of the Union in Copenhagen, on December 14, 1973<sup>2</sup> emphasizes the determination of its members in defining the foreign-political identity of the European Community as a dynamic and above all united Europe.

The main milestones of the Declaration are:

- Reviewing mutual heritage, interests and special obligations of the nine members, as well as the degree of their unity achieved in the Community,
- Assessment of the degree in which the members already act together in the relations to the world and the obligations that arise from it all, as well as
- Taking into consideration the dynamic role of European unity.<sup>3</sup>

All that represents the basic postulates of determination of a future political progress for unification of Europe and the process of rooting European foreign-political identity. The politization of European identity is reflected in the political will of Member States for a successful creation of a united Europe which arises from mutual cultural heritage, mutual economic interests, as well as the provisions laid down in the Treaties of Rome. As a result of those treaties, having in mind the economic interest as a starting point, a mutual market is constituted, i.e. a European Customs Union, joint institutions of the Community, joint policies and the mechanism of political cooperation. European identity in the foreign constellation of relations should raise the European Union in an autonomous international entity. The identity should manifest the integral political whole, the foreign unity and functionality, thus playing a constructive role in the world political scene. Thus, one of the basic syntagmas in the Declaration on European Identity is – Europe has to unite and has to start talking in one voice if it wants to be heard and if it wants to have an

appropriate role in the world.<sup>4</sup> The European identity as a political pledge has to raise the European Union on a pedestal of international decision-making through the cohesion of implementation of foreign policies. Its autonomy and uniqueness is especially emphasized by the European Union in collaboration with the United States of America. The foreign-political acting is manifested based on equality, dialog, partnership, friendship and the need for promoting of universal values of civilization and humanity. It is expressed as joint responsibility of all states in the world which means responsibility of the EU and of the USA as full partners in the world political scene. The dynamic nature of the processes for realizing the great idea of a “united” Europe led to a creation of an axiological fundament which is of greater meaning for the further political development of the European Union especially on its multilateral perspective and perception of the world in international relations. Starting from its essential importance the Union itself is promoted as a hard promoter of functional multilateralism and this is especially important in conditions of creating the new great powers in the world such as China, India, Brazil and Japan. Here we have the tendency to reduce American unilateralism, i.e. unipolarism and the strengthening of Russia and its regional dominance. In such a new international reality and international relations, the European Union will have to develop its own internal capacity and the ability to act in order to efficiently and effectively deal with global political challenges. In that sense the Union should justify more and more as the “consciousness” of civilization which despite the tendencies of uniformity of identities deepens, encourages and nurtures national cultural identities. European identity understood as European multilateralism in the world geo-political practice should surpass the unilateralism of the United States of America and the regional hegemonism of Russia and China.

## 3. On the Complexity of the National Cultural Identity

The national cultural identity is also quite a complex and a multilayer concept, although it is not as complex as the idea on European identity. Cultural identity described as a social achievement in it carries the seal of history and that is why it is connected to the concept of citizenship. However, there is also a danger that it may be used for nationalistic purposes. As a dynamic concept, given more than once, it depends on the conditions in which it is developed, because the cultural identity of a state in 2000 is not the same as 20 years ago. Identity is something that is felt, a not something that is imposed. Thus, it is a concept that is defined as something that is simultaneously artificial, subjective and moving.

The historical development and the contemporariness of

<sup>2</sup> Declaration on European Identity, Copenhagen report, 1973, [www.ena.lu/declaration\\_european\\_identity\\_copenhagen\\_14\\_december\\_1973-020002278.html](http://www.ena.lu/declaration_european_identity_copenhagen_14_december_1973-020002278.html)

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

<sup>4</sup> *ibid*

societies show that nations and nationalism arise from the need to include individuals in some sort of form of community, organization and collective which they can identify with. They can also express their emotions, strives, actions and goals through them in a social, political and cultural fashion. Nationalism finds its basic characteristic upon the sense of affiliation of the individual to the national state, as the widest political organization of a specific nation, in some historical time. Therefore, we can determine the sources and carriers of nationalism as an ideology and as a movement and accept them as real, which vary depending on the historical time and on the climate of political crisis and changes. Thus, in literature and in social practice on nations and on nationalism three basic and at the same time unsurpassable sources can be determined: historical sources of nationalism, socio-psychological sources of nationalism and religious roots of nationalism, i.e. the difference of religions as a source of international intolerance and clashes.

As primary sources of appearance in history, nationalism looks for its legitimacy in the past as a basis for developing a particular nationalistic fanaticism, hatred, and even aggression towards other nations. Anthony Smith, a leading theoretician on nationalism also warns of this<sup>5</sup>. According to him, nationalism as a “myth of historic renewal” is characteristic for many societies in Europe, and especially the countries of South-eastern Europe – for example, the Serbian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Macedonian nationalism. Some are a defensive nationalism, some aggressive and destructive. Analyzing the deeper reasons the basis is the tradition of the patriarchic societies such as beliefs, customs, myths, codes of conduct. Modernizing Europe as a process of changing the old and establishing the new values, rules, and codes of conduct in the socio-economic, political and cultural life, comes into clash with traditionalism and retraditionalization.<sup>6</sup>

The stability of the political community is better provided through the construction of a politically rooted identity whose perspective is a mutual future rather than mutual ethno-national identity. This is especially of importance because national identity is limited in the capability to inspire political unity through its cultural contents and by preoccupation with the past. The reason lies in the ethnical emphasis which cannot expand from “one” nation to “more” nations. Therefore, one of the characteristics of contemporary Europe is a Europe with “more” nations and within the states or among them. European scientific circles believe that if it wants to answer to the cultural diversity and offer an answer for political unity then there needs to be a redefining of the nation. The successful maintenance of the project on European integration and European identity is the new definition on the nation as political community with a sense for a mutual political future where a mutual ethno-national identity is

not necessary.

The solidarity of the citizens with the state, a solidarity which only existed on a national level, must expand on a level of the citizens of the Union. Only then can they imagine how to look for minimal conditions for earning and generally identical conditions for individual determination of life plans. On the other hand, sceptics question that by claiming that there is nothing similar to a “European nation” by which a “European” nation can be constituted.<sup>7</sup> John Rawls, with his teaching on liberalism, unlike Habermas, envisions the integration of Europe on completely different basis. According to him, liberal nations are those that try to protect their own territory, to ensure the safety of their citizens and to preserve free their own political institutions, as well as the freedom and free culture of their own civil society. The mutual feeling of sympathies is defined as a question of identity. Constitutional patriotism as a synonym of European identity regards to the idea of political devotion that should be based on norms and values and indirectly on procedures of liberal-democratic system. According to Miler<sup>8</sup> constitutional patriotism offers a vision which differs from both nationalism and from cosmopolitanism. In other words, the credit for expressing political loyalty does not only go to national culture, nor solely to the world community of people which is characteristic for understanding the term cosmopolitanism. Thus, the issue that can be defined as European constitutional patriotism or more specifically – the meaning of patriotism on an EU level - is quite interesting. Most of the criticism of the idea for constitutional patriotism comes from the misunderstanding of the philosophy of the term and the role which it should play in a united Europe. That means that a carefully elaborate term of supranational constitutional patriotism may contribute in the understanding of a post-sovereign, non-state and pluralistic vision of Europe. The idea of constitutional patriotism is often interpreted as an ambitious project overburdened with meaning and terms such as solidarity and democracy. It could also be understood in a totally different sense from a formal nature, as a word which had arisen from one document and if it is gone, then we cannot talk about constitutional patriotism.

According to Miler, three characteristics are important for Europe. Firstly, it is the problematizing of the issue of European constitutional system. That has always been an open process of debates and political struggle. Actually, the EU as a political organization is founded on mutually agreed projects and activities. Secondly, the EU itself is an open project. Thirdly, the EU is not founded on something that cannot be understood such as a constitutional power or a demos.

“Simply put, European people always had to renegotiate and decide on what they wish to have in common, and what not, and this will continue until they start to strive towards

<sup>5</sup> Smith, A, 1971, *Theories of Nationalism*, 22

<sup>6</sup> Siljanovska, L., 2007, *Media Culture in Euro-integration Processes*, p. 91

<sup>7</sup> Habermas: 2002:128

<sup>8</sup> Miler, J.V., 2008

unity which will always occur around common projects and based on common ideals".<sup>9</sup>

Miler is certain that the last victim will never been a part of the European Treaty, which means that will never be able to call the people to die for Brussels. Along those lines, the EU being understood as a supranational creation without nationalism, the subject of objection may occur through several types of recognition. Firstly, the nations of Europe may acknowledge between themselves as free and equal. Secondly, they should be constitutional elements of Europe, which as people can guarantee one another the right to nurtures certain differences, i.e. the right to remain "others". The EU is usually referred to as a "post-national entity". It is obligated to democracy and the rule of law which became especially visible and manifested in the numerous treaties, starting with the Maastricht Treaty all the way to the newest treaties. Constitutional patriotism is founded on the universal rights which represent:

Firstly, a clear determination for personal autonomy, in the sense of both, private and public autonomy, because both are needed for democracy;

Secondly, in order to keep together and to provide autonomy to persons social rights help encourage a deeper sense of solidarity. Thirdly, there is a determination for respecting cultural diversity, bearing in mind the fact that constitutional patriotism envisages cultural right as well. However, this represents a conditional form for respecting the difference in a sense that it is founded on the "reciprocal acknowledgement of the different cultures of living". Emphasis is placed on the mutually acceptable forms of protection which do not threaten autonomy – private and public.

Social-psychological roots of the identities are founded on the supposed psychological characteristics of social groups, which depending on social-political climate, can be used and misused by the actors of nationalism. What form of feelings will prevail in times of great social crises and of emphasized social contradictions, will greatly depend on the historicity of national identities and of the character of rooting fundamental social values.

#### 4. European Values as a Foundation of European Identity

The pledge for establishing European values, their expansion and unification of the European national states should be looked for in the foundation of European identity. There is a rich literature on the values and their role in society, culture, international relations, and people relations in general. Values, according to Vilfredo Pareto, are beliefs which allow for an opinion of legitimacy or of verification of behaviour or of events to be reached. Or put in other words, they are criteria or goals according to which the individual decides on the correctness or incorrectness of his

behaviour, even if it is not in accordance with his values, they create a frame which gives the margins of his behaviour. Values also represent an ideology, a system of beliefs, customs, traditions and rules of behaviour which represent given norms of behaviour of individuals and collectives in a certain space-time dimension.

Although the issue of one European identity is debatable, still on a European level there is a system of rules, norms and values which sometimes in an invisible way regulate the relations between the nations of Europe. Their role is all the more important that, as times passes by, some of these norms and values are codified and presented in European treaties, thus having a legal framework, i.e. a legal effect. Values as solidarity, equal opportunities, freedom of expression, tolerance and nurturing cultural heritage, are embedded in the Preamble of all European treaties, while the European Charter of Human Rights is represented in the Treaty of the Constitution of Europe.

The European functionary Benita Ferrero-Waldner who as head of the department in charge of foreign affairs of the EU for five years is one of the many propagators for a certain European identity. Just as some other protagonist of such a thesis in the European scientific circles who were interviewed regarding this research, such a thesis is backed by conclusions of mutual history, mutual culture and mutual values which are especially expressed in the stay on other continents. The sense of European keeps together the members of different national states. Thus, the boundaries are not geographical, but are boundaries of a certain European identity. The French politician Jean Monnet will say – we do not join the states, we unite the citizens. European practice shows that building the European identity is possible with mutual values, history and culture. European identity is, thus, seen by many scientific circles as a political instrument in the provision of the European national and cultural diversity. As an instrument for promoting active European citizenship, European identity as a discourse should enable strengthening between European citizens from different countries. Building a collective memory on the European identity is politicized and through specific movement such as Active Citizens for Europe, Active Civil Society for Europe, Together for Europe etc. All these activities which are especially realized in the candidate states for EU membership intend to raise the citizens' awareness on the mutual affiliation to the European continent and their unity through the application of European values and standards in economy, politics, culture, education and health.

According to sociologist Émile Durkheim, Europe has its values which should only be upgraded. The forming of a European society is seen by him solely as a reproduction of any other national state, but on a higher level. Unlike him, Gerard Delanty believes that Europe should build its own new European identity, because the values of the national states cannot be the basis for building a European identity. The European identity, according to him, cannot be drawn from old values, but on the basis of some new values.

<sup>9</sup> Miler, J.V., 2008: 89

Knowledge should represent the most important new value which should be a starting point in the building of a European identity. Thus, Europe should first, and foremost, be identified as a society of knowledge. A similar viewpoint on forming a European identity is also represented by Manuel Castells. According to him, ideas and values borrowed from the national states cannot be a basis for the European society. The fundamental value of the European society is that it is built as a network society, which entails that Europe will not have a sole centre but more knots, i.e. national societies which have different shape and which are interconnected in a network with asymmetrical connections. The network society actually represents a building and development of an information society.

Analyses of scientific thoughts show that European identity represented as an ideology of the European society should find its practical application in the promotion and implementation of the new European values as a collective ideology of the European Union which is realized as its general milestones, i.e. policies. Those are peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, unity and equality, freedom and solidarity, the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, the rule of law and the respect towards national identity.

#### ***4.1. Peace and the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts***

This represents the fundamental European value and also the strongest motivation for starting the process of European integration. The policy of peace is the fundamental goal and task of the European Union.

#### ***4.2. Unity and Equality***

With Eurointegration as a sole internal connection the problems of the citizens in all states can be overcome in a much better fashion. There is no unity without unconditional equality. This means that nobody could be subordinate or discriminated on any basis. The essence of European reality should be the maxim - no single country should have predominance over another.

#### ***4.3. Freedom and Solidarity***

Freedom is expressed in the movement of people, capital, ideas, services etc. over national borders. European society should build its identity by developing free competition on the wide and free European market, as well as freedom of choice of work or business. As a counterbalance to freedom, i.e. free competition, the European Union should develop the European value – solidarity. This entails that older Member States of the EU should in solidarity aid the development of the candidate states for EU membership, as well as the new members. This is especially necessary among the EU Member States as practical aid for common people in the cases of natural and other catastrophes.

#### ***4.4. Fundamental Freedoms and Right of People and the Rule of Law***

Respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of people and the rule of law are two fundamental conditions for joining the EU, but also a condition on which the Constitution of the Union depends.

#### ***4.5. Respecting National Identity***

The EU Member States respect each other's national identity to the fullest. Difference in national characteristics is understood as an advantage and a quality of the EU, a not as some sort of fault or a problem. EU members do not want to change national identity with uniformity neither.

### **5. The Symbols of the EU as a Manifest Mark of European Identity**

The EU uses its symbols as manifest marks of a community that is recognizable in terms of other communities: the European flag, the European anthem, the European currency, the draft of the European constitution, Eurovision, the European Cups.

Upon its establishment in 1949, the Council of Europe quickly understood the need of a symbol which will display the pledge for its European unity and identity. At the beginning of the 50's of the twentieth century, different expert groups, comities and boards looked at the numerous suggestions from different artists, heraldic experts and amateur-enthusiasts from all over the world without reaching any kind of decision. In December, 1955 the Comity of Ministers accepted the idea of Arsène Heitz, employed in the Council of Europe, which was – a crown with 12 five-pointed stars whose tips did not touch. The circle of 12 golden stars set upon a blue background symbolizes the people of Europe and their unity. The number of stars is unchangeable, thus it is always twelve and equals the ideals of unity and harmony and reminds us of the months of the year and of the twelve signs of the zodiac. As a sign of public approval throughout all of Europe it was placed on the buildings of the public institutions of Brussels at the universal exhibition in 1958.

The Overture of the Ode of Happiness from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was accepted as the European anthem, which from 1986 became another mutual symbol for all European.

However, those are just external manifest marks of European identity which are difficult to enter into the development of the sense of internal affiliation of the identity of the Member States of the Union especially in the collective memory of its citizens as European identity. The affiliation towards one's own national convictions, feelings, differences in ethnic convictions, values and traditions, again as main carriers of identity point out individuals that achieve their own mutual communication in accordance with the social role that they achieve in a certain socio-

economic, political and cultural context. Thus, the social identity of the individual, created under the influence of his various interaction with its immediate and distance social surroundings, is actually a question of affiliation towards different social groups and categories determined by gender, age, class, nation etc. Social identity as a multilayer concept does not only refer to individuals, but also to social groups which it arrays in a certain manner in the social system.

Here, social identity implements the principle of inclusion and exclusion of members of a certain group according to different marks with the help of those that differ from the members of a certain other group. Cultural identity, in this context, can be seen as a manner of categorization in a sense of "us" and "them" based on cultural differences<sup>10</sup>.

"Cultural identity is the self-consciousness of the members of a group which is historically created and developed depending on the criteria which that group establishes in the relations with other social groups".<sup>11</sup>

The determined self-aware and original existence of the individual cannot be excluded in that sense because it is the true creator and carrier of social relations. In any case this leads to the conclusion known to anthropology and sociology that cultural identity is not the need for a new concept tied to our time, but a notorious fact of the history of culture and of cultural dynamics.

## 6. European Identity for ensuring the Survival of the EU

According to the opinions of part of the European scientific circles, the promotion of European identity is done to ensure the survival of the European Union. Such a thesis is being explained by analysis of activities of national governments in developing and strengthening one's own national and cultural identities. Thus, the building of the European identity should be based on the building of a European history which will neither represent a mixture, nor a simple collection of history of national states, its members. All that indicates the sensitivity of the issue of the European identity. In today's constellation of relations on the continent, the crisis of the European identity is experienced only as a crisis of trust. According to the surveyed in this research there are several reasons for that. Firstly, we have the insecurity of the citizens due to recession and the bad economic state, unemployment, and the crisis in the Euro zone. Many European functionaries, such as scientists that deal with the identity issue of the European Union, bring the issue of European identity in relation to the rapid expansion of the Union. This is evident after the fall of the Iron Curtain with the new Member States from the Eastern bloc with communistic background

and an undeveloped democracy.

In that sense, the European identity should be observed as a developing category and analyzed in a much more critical fashion and from a new angle. This should be done in accordance with the new socio-economic and cultural conditions. Identity should especially be developed with the development and promotion of policies and institutions of the Union by enabling bigger cohesiveness and functionality. This will simultaneously enable the decrease of the sense of impotence and frustration with the citizens who need to build their inner feelings of affiliation towards Europe based on its loyalty, the application of policies and above all its consistency in the unity of all the citizens through various manifest marks and actions.

## 7. Identity as a Unity of Differences

The issue of identity became especially important in the period of transition, as were the cases with the dissolution of USSR and SFRY. The countries that came out of these federations created their own identity in international relations which is not so simple and easy. On one occasion, talking about the problems that Europe is facing on its way to integrations, Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, asks if the process can be reduced or take away the sovereignty of the EU Member States and does integration lead to the loss of national identity at the expense of European identity. In his opinion, although the word sovereignty is not even mentioned in the rejected European constitution, the Member States cannot fully relinquish their identity and simply accept solely European patriotism which is manifested with an occasional match of the Union's interests.

Such problematization of the issue of European identity is accepted more and more by the scientific circles of the aspiring candidate states for Union membership. Macedonia, as one of the countries from the Western Balkans in South-eastern Europe, pays more and more attention to the development and nurturing of its national identity through an internal and external promotion of cultural landmarks, traditions and its own historic past, whereas European identity is only understood as idealization of European values.

Analyses on the debate on the identity of European countries lead to the need of redefining European identity. The term itself is actually very elastic and is subordinated to external socio-economic and political context. Here we have the political, economic and safety changes that in the last twenty years have happened in Europe. The European Union is still searching for a politically and historically sound vision on the European Community that is supposed to be capable of creating its own future and identity. On the one hand, it could be said that the integration processes of the Central and South-eastern European countries in the EU give an opportunity for an easy access of European political identity which becomes more and more dominant in comparison to national mark of the countries. However, all

<sup>10</sup> Petkovska, A., 2001, Tribune, Skopje: Broadcasting Council

<sup>11</sup> Cultural Rights, (group of authors), 1999, Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, p. 22

that is expected to be just of a short-term nature as a self-expression of these countries that they now belong to the bigger European family. At the same time, they accept European identity as an external identifier for determining its own role and position between the countries of Western Europe. Simultaneously, most new European centers ask if the differences in the Union are a mutual gain and mutual good and what is the European model that separates them from the countries that are not members of the EU. On the other hand, contrary to their mindset, the old ladies of Europe, Germany, France, Italy, England, turn more and more to their own national policies, values, and cultures such as developing and nurturing of national identities, and pointing out their own cultural values and marks. Thus, the dilemma around the definition and essential meaning of the national, collective, regional and transnational identity remains. One Israeli saying goes: How will we know who we are, if we don't know what others are. If we know what others are, then we will know who we are.

According to several theoreticians of European identity, Europe should be built on all different human dimensions, but nurturing historic and cultural gains turned to new humanism, founded on the ideas of freedom of the individual and on the different identities of the continent. German theoretician Franz Lothar Altmann says that in the 19th century in the Balkans national identity was built on the linguistic and religious identity which proved as the strongest elements for unity. As an exception he notes the integration of different linguistic groups in one state such as the Albanians in Serbia, the Turks in Bulgaria, the Hungarians in Romania, the Kurds in Turkey. The examples of Yugoslavia and of Macedonia show that forming a national identity is not an easily achievable task, especially after 1980, in ex Yugoslavia, where the population started expressing itself less often as Yugoslavian. The national identity of the SFRY remains too weak to be accepted. The Republic of Macedonia goes through similar phases when Bulgaria and Greece deny the existence of a Macedonian nation and when, according to Altmann, Macedonian identity is not acceptable to the non-Slavs, such as the Albanians.

Within the EU, the states nurture an affiliation of a political-safety and economic environment, which gives a dimension of nurturing the collective identity. Identity as a sense of affiliation of a group also does not exclude the connections to other groups and it can function in a hierarchical form of identities where one identity is dominant and the rest are of lesser importance. Still, accepting the smaller collective identities is a manner of integration and coexistence. It is a principle on which the EU itself functions. This is allowed by the skilful application of pluralistic policy, i.e. respecting pluralism of the interests of national collectivity.

History knows numerous cases when the creation of new states helped the process of creating new nations, but also vice versa. Analyzing this process, the American theoretician Rasma Karklins believes that each person has

two or more identities, that all people belong to at least two communities - that of a territorial civil community of the state and an ethnic community. In a multiethnic state, in an ideal case, the two identities are harmonically organized. Or, if one state is build of several nations, then it can be an ideal example of a community of communities. Both cases would not be a utopia for forming the identity of the European Union, if the future of the EU is not a utopia for the identity of Europe. After uniting the Italian state in 1861 the Italian intellectual Massimo D'Azeglio said – We have made Italy, now all we need to do is to create Italians.

Today's European politicians face a modern version of D'Azeglio's dilemma – they have created the European Union, and now they need to create Europeans. Starting from the multilayer of identities, the building of a collective identity usually lasts several generations. They need to convince over 500 millions of EU citizens that they need to be more attached to Europe and less to their states. Although European identity is not strong enough, symbolically speaking, without it the European Union would look like a building with bad foundation which is opposing a political and economic earthquake. Just like Italy, Europe too is divided into north and south, with the same problems and tensions that rise amongst citizens.

## 8. European Identity as a Response to Globalization

In the focus of an intense debate in the last years arise more and more issues on globalization, its beginnings, reasons and consequences which as effects are felt by the national states. The fact is that globalization is essentially and in a much deeper manner than it seems restructures the ways of life in the socio-economic, political and cultural sphere. It is lead by the West and brings strong signs of American political and economic power. Its consequences are also considerably irregular. However, globalization is not just the dominance of the West over the rest of the world. It hits the USA just as any other countries. Globalization of the economic activity is joined by waves of cultural globalization. That process is called cultural globalization.

Thus, the issues of cultural identity until recently were surrounded by issues of cultural and media imperialism. The different degrees of concern arose from technological determinism. Here, we should, above all mention the concern due to new technologies such as satellite transmission. However, the expression – cultural imperialism announces an invasion and an element of force<sup>12</sup>. This arises from an influential movement of resistance that was created by the developing countries in their struggle to preserve their cultural integrity and political autonomy. It is a result of the insight that they are in danger by the western cultural and media imperialism.

<sup>12</sup> McQail, 1994: 113

Thus, as John Tomlinson says, even today – there still is a reason as to why cultural imperialism must be taken seriously as a viewpoint from which cultural globalization can be seen<sup>13</sup>.

According to Tomlinson, this is due to the fact that real issues that deal with cultural politics show just how much certain national governments understand the threat of cultural imperialism very seriously. Therefore, Tomlinson strives for assimilation of theories of cultural globalization into theory on cultural imperialism. He points out three reasons for this<sup>14</sup>. Firstly, it is the omnipresence of western cultural products, i.e. that there is much evidence that western cultural taste and practice are become global. The second reason is the long history of western imperialism and the fact that what we call “third world countries” are in a historical connection of the political and economic submissiveness to the countries of the developed west, often times connected to colonial past<sup>15</sup>. The third reason for the transfer of cultural globalization into cultural imperialism is the central set-up of capitalism as a cultural influence: “globalization is essentially advanced capitalistic globalization”<sup>16</sup>.

The feeling that “global capitalism is important not just because of its economic power, but also because of the creation of our cultural experience because it builds even the way we understand our everyday life”<sup>17</sup> is also present. Furthermore, as a support to his claim Tomlinson offers “three invitations to consider the aforementioned issues: “Look behind the obviousness of global cultural products”<sup>18</sup>, “Always approach global culture as a dialectic one” and “Understand globalization as a decentralized complex process”<sup>19</sup>. The conclusion that Tomlinson comes by is:

“It is pretty evident that globalization does not promise the techno-utopia of the McLuhian global village, but it does not seem very likely that it will produce a homogenized dystopia in which the same people with power would dominate, and which was foretold in the thesis of cultural imperialism... Maybe the only thing that we can foretell today is an uncertain, unequal, but radically opened cultural future”.<sup>20</sup> Tomlinson points out the boundaries of the paradigm of the cultural imperialism because the cultural influence will not come by the type of linear roads that was foretold by cultural imperialism. This is due to the process of globalization, which is essentially decentralized and produces new forms of advantages and disadvantages. Forms that we are yet to recognize as

affirmation of our own cultural values in the global world or as unification of cultural goods which are deformed in a standard cultural homogenization.

Lately emphasis is placed on difference, and not on unity. As a response to globalization, the European Union expresses the need for acknowledgement of cultural differences and preserving the different European identities. Thus, European identity is felt more and more outside the boundaries of the European Union as a response to the Americanization and the global flows.

## 9. The Media and European Cultural Identity

Media, especially electronic media have great influence in the nurturing and developing national, cultural identity. In the beginning radio, and late television in Europe were instruments which the collective life and culture of the nation were built, i.e. radio and television created a culture that became mutual for the total population and in a completely new type of mutual public life. In the USA, where commercial electronic media represent a norm, the national networks ABC, CBS and NBC were used for the same purpose – focus on national interests and activities. Thus, we can say that electronic media today have a double role and that they serve the political public sphere of the national state and they are a focus for national and cultural identification. Through them, as key institutions, the public started regarding itself as members of a national community.

On a European level, with the creation of the new media order and of global media, the problem with the media space became more and more actualized. The dilemma is caused by the policy of quotas and other quantifiers, intervention measures applied by the EU Member states. They are built in the European directive for television without borders which are in collision with the principles of program autonomy of the broadcaster. This implies that the European Union has not been able to create an appropriate mutual media culture or a base for European citizenship, i.e. the issues on identity and on citizenship remain two separate issues. This, also, imposes the real danger that in the European audiovisual space the compensations of the cultural identification will become dominant over the political goals of the debate of the public communication. Pursuant to Article 4 of the directive on television without borders, all EU Member States, and the countries under their jurisdiction, must provide wherever possible the broadcast of mostly European works, i.e. 50%. The goal of this provision is to encourage the broadcast of European works in the audiovisual media and to exclude American series and feature films from the programs. This part of Article 4 of the Directive is a minimum standard and EU Member States are allowed to apply stricter measures for broadcasters under jurisdiction. For instance, in France, the broadcasters must air at least 60% European works, and the

13 Tomlinson, J., 1997, *Cultural Globalization and Cultural Imperialism* in A. Mohammadi(ed) *International Communication and Globalization*, London: Sage, p. 175

14 Ibid: 1997: 175- 180

15 Ibid: 177

16 Lash and Urry, 1994: 280

17 Tomlinson, J., 1997:178

18 Ibid: 180

19 Ibid: 185

20 Ibid: 190



quotas for French music refer to French radios, too. This measure on quotas within the EU was initially directed towards encouragement of the flow of programs in Europe which was indented for the strengthening of the concept of European identity. However, media reality shows that most of the programs that are aired in order to meet the requirements of the European quotas in the Union Member States are of national origin. Also, one of the ways to protect the cultural identity, used in Europe, is the goals on policy on language. Bearing in mind that language is an important component of cultural identity, some countries, besides the quotas on programs of European origin place provisions in their legislation that refer to the goals of the policy on language. In France, the broadcasters must air 40% audiovisual and cinematographic works initially made in France. The same example can be seen in the Netherlands, where broadcasters are required to air a quota of 40% original programs in Dutch. To protect cultural identity in Europe, despite the increasing Americanization in the music, entertainment and film industry, special program requirements are introduced in the laws on broadcasting or the licenses, i.e. work permits. This is especially so for programs from the area of culture. For example, in the French speaking part of Belgium, the public broadcaster must air a minimum number of programs from the field of culture (literature, music, games etc.) established by the board of managers of the channel. In the Netherlands, 20% of the air time must be dedicated to culture, whereas 10% must refer to art. Of course, there are not only quantitative measures on protection and nurturing cultural identity. One of them is nurturing the European and national production. Those are the programs by which the European and national audiovisual industry are encouraged, i.e. the media programs on a level of the EU and the national and local program schemes. As it is state in the policy of the European Commission: "Only a strong European industry can enable a diversity of programs and an international influence of the European culture"<sup>21</sup>. The organizational configuration of television is also a non-quantifying measure for protection of the European identity. Cultural identity is a developing concept and may be preserved and developed through the encouragement of alternative and innovative programs within the traditional channels or through the existence of channels with a specific task, such as Channel4 in Great Britain or ARTE in France and Germany, which offer alternative ways of view of a country or the world. However, cultural identity can also be expressed through the internal structure of the broadcasters or the regulators. So, for example, in Germany, the different socio-cultural groups are represented in German society in the structure of public broadcasters and in the regional regulatory bodies. France and Belgium have the regulative approach as a model of the national regulations

of media which relies on a more restrictive definition of culture, in a sense of art culture, emphasizing the legal provisions especially in terms of the quantitative measures such as quotas, the dominant role of public authorities and the tradition of quantitative assessment of the program offer via assessment models. In Germany, Great Britain and Sweden there is an institutional model which is characterized with an emphasis of the social role of television, meanwhile relying on the wider concept of culture, the emphasis of the self-regulating system of the public broadcasters, the representation of civil society in broadcasting and the regulatory bodies, such as the importance of the concept on the program autonomy of broadcasting organizations and the tradition of the qualitative assessment of programs, because quality is what matters. However, a mutual feature is that the access to the culture of the media differs largely from state to state. The debate on cultural identity, also, is not led with the same intensity in all countries. It is very impressionable in France and in Belgium, hardly noticeable in Great Britain and limited in Germany, due to the connotation with historical past. Nonetheless, protecting and nurturing cultural identity is a goal shared by all countries, which although is not always expressed openly, it is acknowledged and implemented into practice with various mechanisms. Thus, elaborating the phenomena of cultural identity in the sphere of media does not entail some sort of unification, or an establishing of cultural standards and criteria that are permanently assigned. Channelling in that sense, or insisting upon it, leads to a state of caricaturing and mocking, such as laziness and crisis of spirit. From the standpoint, the media as creative laboratories generally lose the sense of searching for new possibilities of expression.

## 10. Conclusion

Strengthening the Union as a political unit, the Maastricht Treaty from 1992 tries to establish a direct connection between the EU and the citizens by introducing the right to European citizenship. In that sense we have the Declaration on European Identity adopted on the Summit of Member States of the Union in Copenhagen, on December 14, 1973, which as a political document emphasizes the determination of its members in defining the foreign-political identity of the European community as a dynamic and above all united Europe. Despite it all, European identity in the foreign constellation of relations still cannot raise the European Union in an autonomous international entity. If that is the case, then that is expressed more in the relations with the United States of America. Inside the Union, especially in Western Europe, national and cultural identities prevail, and defining the European identity is seen more and more as a political category, as a phenomenon for creating a collective memory which should show the internal sense of trust, safety and of strengthening the European values. Thus, internal cohesion

<sup>21</sup> European Commission, "Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting", Press release: 233- Nr: 9755/01, Luxembourg, 21 June, 2001

and functionality of the European Union in conditions of its institutional and financial crisis produce a crisis of European identity, because it is more difficult to break from the tight, national frames of the Member States. Deeply rooted, in the mindset of the European, are the divisions of the old and the new ladies of Europe, then of Eastern and Western Europe, divisions of the rich north and the poor south and all that lately defines Europe as an identity crisis. Redefining European identity cannot be opposite of redefining the Union as a political supranational community, as a community of national and cultural diversities, i.e. defining the European identity as a unity of differences. If the thesis of certain scientific circles that European identity represents a response to globalization, i.e. to the more frequent Americanization in terms of media and cultural industry is accepted, then such a general acceptance is just one ideological external concept without an internal expressed feeling of a collective European identity which encourages local traditions, beliefs, customs and values of nations for protecting their own cultural identities. Therefore, standard cultural homogenizations or unification of cultural goods in Europe can only achieve the opposite effect from the European identity understood as a unity of national differences which, in fact, should be understood as preserving the different European identities. The pledge for establishing European values, their expansion and unification of the European national states should be looked for in the foundation of European identity. The system of rules, norms and values which sometimes in an invisible way regulate the relations between the nations of Europe and their application through appropriate policies of the EU, should represent an expression of mutual geographic affiliation, traditions and culture which is built by the collective memory for the existence of the European identity.

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